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An investigation of a past event or condition, rationally conducted, normally requires the production and consideration of all relevant material from all available sources. The Anglo-American law
of Evidence consists largely of limitations upon this normal process.
Some of these limitations are due to the objectives of judicial investigation and the constitution of the investigating tribunal; some, to judicial
and legislative judgments concerning the comparative values of competing social policies; and some, to historical accident. As they have
been applied in cases with myriad variations of facts, they have become
encrusted with qualifications and have developed complexities and inconsistencies, which are the despair of thoughtful members of the bench
and bar. An intelligent attempt to meet the need for clarification and
simplification requires an examination of the existing restrictions, to
ascertain to what extent they are justified, and what sort of remedy is
practicable.
INCOMPETENCIES OF WITNESSES

At common law at different times, and subject to various exceptions, a person was subject to be disqualified as a witness by reason of
alienage, race, infancy, mental derangement, interest, marital relationship, or conviction of crime. These disqualifications in their most
obnoxious aspects have long since been abolished in the great majority
of jurisdictions. There are, however, a few states in which a husband
or wife is incompetent for or against the other, and a few in which a
conviction of perjury makes the convict incompetent to testify. In
t A. B., 19o2, A. M., 1903, LL. B., 19o5, Harvard University; A. M., 1919, Yale
University; Professor of Law at Harvard University; co-editor, CASES ON COMMON
LAW PLEADING (1917) ; author, INTRoDUCTIoN TO STUDY OF LAW (I924) ; co-editor,

CASES ON EVIDENCE (934) ; and of numerous articles on the law of Evidence in legal
periodicals.
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many also there remains a vestige of the disqualification on account of
interest. The first two survivals may be regarded as local idiosyncrasies destined soon to extinction. The last requires more serious
consideration.
In most states when legislation made parties and other interested
persons generally competent as witnesses, it placed limitations upon
their power to testify in actions against the representatives of a decedent or incompetent. In some the interested witness may not testify
to any claim originating in the lifetime of the decedent or during the
competency of the incompetent; in others as to any transaction occurring before the death or the origin of the incompetency; in still others
as to any matter to which the decedent or incompetent might have been
able to testify were he alive and competent; in most the prohibition
covers any transaction or conversation with the decedent or incompetent. The courts in applying and attempting to justify these statutes have indulged in some pleasing and plausible phrases: "This right
and privilege (to testify) must be mutual. .

.

. If death has closed

the lips of the one party, the policy of the law is to close the lips of the
other".' To provide otherwise "would run counter to interests so
sacred and a policy so clear, that public sentiment would not tolerate
their sacrifice". 2 The foundation of this rhetoric is nothing more than
the fear of perjury. As the West Virginia court put it, "The temptation to falsehood and concealment in such cases is considered too great,
to allow the surviving party to testify in his own behalf. Any other
view of this subject . . would place in great peril the estates of the
dead, and would in fact make them an easy prey for the dishonest and
unscrupulous. .

.

."

Commentators and judges have repeatedly pointed out the fallacies
involved in such assertions and assumptions. The fear of perjury was
the basis for the discarded rule disqualifying all interested persons; but
experience and reason compelled the conclusion that the fear was exaggerated and the remedy, even if effective, worse than the disease.
Besides, it was not effective, for usually persons without the disqualification but having equal or greater motives for lying could be found to
produce the same evidence. There is no doubt that much perjury is committed in our courts, but that it is or would be more frequent in cases
against estates of decedents or incompetents than in other classes of litigation is a gratuitous assumption. Given a litigant willing to perjure
himself and a lawyer willing to present perjured testimonr, no exclusionary rule of evidence will operate to prevent it. That litigant and that
I. Louis v. Easton, 5o Ala. 470, 471 (1873).
2. Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa. 297, 304 (i87o).

3. Owens v. Owens, 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878).
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lawyer will be willing to suborn perjury, and it will be scarcely less difficult to find complaisant witnesses than it was anciently to find professional compuigators. In actions for services rendered against the estates
of decedents, relatives of the claimant are rarely unavailable to a plaintiff bent on recovery.
Moreover it seems often to be taken for granted that to admit the
testimony is to give it almost conclusive effect whereas in fact it is
almost invariably received with suspicion by judge and jury. The
opponent too, always may test it by cross-examination and urge the
likelihood of its fabrication; frequently he is able to oppose it by circumstantial evidence. With equal disregard for experience it is almost
always assumed that rejection of the interested testimony is the only
remedy. The alternative of making admissible self-serving declarations of the decedent or incompetent is generally not considered,
although enlightening data regarding the alternative are available. In
1927 The Commonwealth Fund published a report of its Committee,
which had made an investigation of the operation of statutes dealing
with testimony by interested survivors. The following excerpt there4
from is pertinent:
"The ordinary statute has proved to be extremely cumbersome
and difficult of application. For example, the Alabama statute
had, up to 1914, been before the Supreme Court in one hundred
and forty-eight cases; the Iowa statute, up to 1912, in ninety-four
cases; the Maryland statute, up to i9io, in ninety-one cases; the
Minnesota statute, up to 1917, in one hundred and thirty-two
cases; and the North Carolina statute, up to i919, in two hundred
and twenty-one cases. Any statute which requires from ninetyone to two hundred and twenty-one pronouncements of the court
of last resort to enable the bar to know what it means must be a
curse to litigants and lawyers alike. And what shall be said of
the New York statute? Up to x92i, it had been before the appellate courts no less than three hundred and twenty-four times; and
still some of its phrases are of doubtful meaning. Mr. J. B.
Greenfield of the New York bar has written a text-book of some
four hundred pages of which three hundred and seventy-seven are
devoted to the judicial interpretation of this statute, which covers
less than fourteen lines of print. Very few, if any, of the members of the New York City bar have more experience with this
section as applied to will cases than Mr. Henry W. Taft. He says:
'By section 829 it is sought to guard against the danger,
sometimes very real, of dishonest claims asserted against
decedents' estates, by excluding communications made by a
decedent to an interested person. This restriction not
4. Morgan, Chaffee, Jr., Gifford, Hinton, Hough, Johnston, Sunderland, Wigmore,
Tz LAW op EvmENc% SomE PRovosAts FoR rrs REFORm(i927) 27.
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infrequently works intolerable hardship in preventing the
establishment of a meritorious claim. Furthermore, it has
been enforced with the most rigorous literalness, and has
been the occasion of a labyrinth of subtle decisions. A long
experience leads me to believe that the evils guarded against
do not justify the retention of the rule. In the early development of our jurisprudence the testimony of all interested witnesses was excluded; but experience gradually led to the conclusion that the restriction should be relaxed and more
reliance should be placed upon the efficacy of our process of
investigating truth. Cross-examination, for instance, has
been found to be well calculated to uncover a fraudulent
scheme concocted by an interested party; and where that has
failed the scrutiny to which the testimony of a witness is subjected by the court and by the jury, has proven efficacious in
discovering the truth, to say nothing of the power of circumstantial evidence to discredit the mere oral statement of an
interested witness.'
"Several states have experimented with more liberal statutes
with apparent success. In New Hampshire the interested survivor
is permitted to testify to transactions with decedent, 'when it
clearly appears to the court that injustice may be done without the
testimony of the party.' In Arizona he may so testify 'if required
by the court.' In New Mexico, Oregon, and Virginia, he may
give such evidence but no verdict or judgment can be based upon
his uncorroborated testimony, and in the latter two states certain
self-serving statements of the decedent are admissible. In Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island he is entirely competent,
and declarations of the decedent are also admissible. ...
"Experience in each of these eight states, excepting only New
Hampshire, has shown that these more liberal and simpler statutes
have the great practical advantage of being easily comprehended
and administered. Do they secure this advantage at the expense ot
justice, or do they aid in the ascertainment of truth? The observations of lawyers and judges, who have seen the rights of clients
and litigants adjudicated under them, should throw much light
upon these questions. Connecticut has the simplest statutes and
has had the longest experience with them. A questionnaire was
submitted to members of the bar and bench of Connecticut with
special reference to the provisions authorizing the receipt in evidence of declarations of decedents. Two hundred and eightyeight answers were received, of which eighty-eight recorded no
experience.
"The practical importance of this character of evidence in
actual litigation is shown by the fact that sixty lawyers reported
one or more cases where these declarations were the exclusive evidence in support or in contradiction of the claim, and ninety-three
reported one or more cases where they were the most important
evidence.
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"Of twenty-one lawyers without experience, twenty thought
greater safeguards necessary. Of one hundred and fifty-two
lawyers having experience, sixty per cent were satisfied with the
statutes as they are. The Justices of the Supreme Court were
unanimously of this opinion, and eighty-one per cent of the
Superior Court Judges agreed. Of the four Common Pleas
Judges, three believed additional safeguards advisable. Outside
of these, the only class of lawyers opposed to these provisions were
those who had little or no experience with them. And those of
experience who suggested amendment usually advised only the
requirement of preliminary findings by the judge or the requirement of corroboration.
"Whether the provisions need amendment or not, they are
decidedly to be desired if they aid in the ascertainment of truth
rather than tend to encourage fraud and perjury. Upon the application of this drastic test all of the judges of the Supreme and
Superior Courts found them good; only one judge of the Common
Pleas Court dissented, while one other was in doubt. Therefore,
out of nineteen judges of the higher courts, seventeen, or over
eighty-nine per cent, believed that these provisions aid in the ascertainment of truth. Of all lawyers and judges having any experience, seventy per cent regarded them as beneficent while only thirteen and five-tenths per cent considered them harmful. Of those
having experience in more than five cases, eighty-four and fivetenths per cent thought them a positive help in the correct solution
of litigated issues; and only in the group having no experience at
all was the majority opinion to the contrary. In a word the opposition to these statutes is in inverse ratio to experience with them." r
5. Two members of the Supreme Court of Connecticut express the following
opinion:
(i) "I have frequently heard the existing law of Connecticut severely criticized
as regards the statutes quoted at the head of the questionnaire. Such criticisms as
I have heard have always gone to the text of the provisions as suggesting dire
possibilities of fraud arising from trumped up claims against the estate of one who
is no longer alive to speak for himself. Such possibilities do, of course, exist, and
cases are not wanting where injustice has been perpetrated. Yet I think more injustice would follow the lack of provisions similar to those which we now have.
"I think the criticisms of our present provisions are rather academic. They
work quite well in practice. The cases where a claimant comes into court with a
bare recital of a promise by a decedent unsupported by other witnesses or weighty
confirmatory circumstances are rare, and not likely ordinarily to succeed in gaining
a recovery. Presumably a judge has some experience and ability in handling disputed issues of fact, and also counsel may be credited with the ordinary skill of the
profession. If so, the trumped up case will almost certainly fail." Id. at 32.
(2) "From my experience as lawyer and judge I think the statute is right in
theory and on the whole promotes justice. It is for the benefit of the defendant
as well as of the plaintiff. Like any other rule of evidence it may aid a fraudulent
claim. But I think it is a step in the right direction and does more good than
harm." Ibid.
Lawyers experienced at the bar and on the trial bench made these statements:
(i)"I have had a good deal of experience with the statutes referred to,-Sections 5735 and 5736, CoNN. GEN. STAT. (igi8), not only during the term of my
office as Judge of the Probate Court for the District of New Haven for ten years,
but as a practicing lawyer for over forty years at the New Haven County Bar.
The statute was formerly called 'a statute to encourage perjury', a misnomer in my
opinion. Not only as a judge of the Court, but in my practice, I have found the
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It is therefore believed that the time has come to abolish all incompetencies of witnesses, and to allow the trier of fact to hear and weigh
relevant testimony from any person capable of expressing himself so
as to be understood by the judge and jury either directly or through an
interpreter.
PRIVILEGES AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

If a party is entitled to present as a witness any person having
communicable relevant information, should any such person have a
privilege not to testify at all, or not to testify concerning specified matters? Or should a party have a privilge to prevent him from testifying
to such matters? If these questions are to be answered in the affirmative, it will be not because there is any danger that the testimony will
be untrustworthy or be incapable of valuation by the trier, but rather
because of a legislative or judicial conviction that the benefit to a social
interest accruing from the suppression of such evidence outweighs the
harm done thereby in the investigation of particular disputes.
Too often such a legislative or judicial conviction seems to be
based on inadequate data or on sentiment rather than on fact. For
example, judicial opinion long asserted that to permit a husband or
wife to testify for or against one another would be to destroy marital
statutes very beneficial, and in a large majority of cases a real benefit. Personally
I have never known a case where they have been abused. I should dislike very
much to see the statutes changed in any way, except as indicated in my answers to
your questions."
(2) "I cannot tell in how many cases I have had testimony introduced under
this statute, but in a good many, both in cases in which I was counsel and when
I was holding trial court. I know of no case in which such testimony opened the
door to fraud or perjury any more than it is opened by every class of testimony;
and personally I consider this statute a wise and beneficial one' and think that the
general tendency represented thereby is to be encouraged rather than restrained."
Id. at 33.
Other active practitioners gave this testimony:
(I) "I have had numerous cases, in fact so many that I could not state the number, and I have been on both sides, that is to say, for and against the estate of
deceased persons, and it has been my experience that the statute in question has
aided and secured justice. I would not favor any change." Id. at 34.
(2) "I have known of numerous cases of serious injustice in the state of New
York where the rule is the reverse of the Connecticut rule. I do not recall any
case where I thought fraud was perpetrated or injustice done and I think if I had
had any such experience, I should remember it because, owing to unfortunate experiences in the State of New York and knowledge of many other instances in
cases in which I was not engaged, I have entertained the opinion that the Connecticut rule was eminently superior, and if I had ever known of a case where the
Connecticut rule worked badly I think I should have remembered it.
"My experience is that litigation does not follow in Connecticut situations of
this sort because the statements and memoranda of the deceased settle the question
and satisfy everybody concerned as to what the facts are. My experience is that
if any possible injustice has been wrought it has been favorable to the estate of the
deceased rather than to the contrary. The general tendency of everybody concerned
is to pay a very high respect to memoranda of the deceased and this has prevailed
sometimes when the opposing party contradicted it.
"I do not think the law should be changed." Ibid.
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harmony. Experience under statutes, some of which make spouses
competent but not compellable witnesses against each other, and others
of which make them both competent and compellable, has exploded this
idea, but it still remains the foundation of the rule privileging confidential communications between husband and wife. Likewise the theory
that public health is promoted by statutes making communications
between physician and patient privileged rests solely on a priorigrounds.
No statistics as to health in states where no such privilege exists, as
compared with those in states where it is recognized, can be tortured
into a support for it; but the law reports, and the experience of judges
and lawyers furnish ample evidence that such a privilege operates to
suppress the truth and to further injustice. Consequently, a thoroughgoing reformation of the law of evidence would begin with the abolition
of all privileges, and then recreate only such of them as reason and
experience justify.
The privilege of an accused in a criminal action to refrain from
testifying and the privilege against self-incrimination are in a class by
themselves. They are so thoroughly imbedded in the Anglo-American
system that even to question their fundamental validity seems futile,
particularly in this day when every safeguard to personal liberty should
be strengthened. And yet if we assume the continuance of a public
trial before a judge and jury, with the accused represented by competent counsel, it is difficult to find any reason why he should not be
required to take the stand and be treated like a witness or party in a
civil action. And why should a witness or party in open court be privileged to refuse to give incriminating answers? However much he may
need protection from abuse by police and prosecutors, he hardly needs
protection from abuse by judge and jury. And it is arguable that at
least some of the evils of the so-called third degree are due to the
realization by police and prosecutors that the accused cannot be required
to talk in open court. A theoretical code of evidence would make an
accused compellable as well as competent as a witness and would recognize no privilege to refuse to give incriminating answers in open
court. It would not attempt to regulate the conduct of police and prosecutors by the feeble device of an exclusionary rule of evidence which is
one of the causes of the disease it seeks to cure. It would leave that to
a more direct and effective agency of government. The theoretical code
would assume the continuance of a system which furnishes a competent
judge, an impartial jury in all criminal trials, opportunity to be represented by counsel, and a public trial. The experience of the past and
the threats of the present may make such an assumption questionable,
and require a legislator to temper his theory with caution. Perhaps the
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most that should be sought is an enactment which will preserve these
privileges but will permit the judge in his discretion to comment upon
and to allow counsel to comment upon, and the trier of fact to draw
all reasonable inferences from, an exercise of either privilege.
The privilege which covers confidential communications between
client and attorney originally belonged to the attorney. He could not
be compelled to violate his obligation as a gentleman to keep such a communication secret, but the courts were not so tender with the client; he
must disclose. Now the client alone has the privilege; he need not disclose and can require the attorney to do so. And as usually happens,
a new rationalization is provided for an old rule which has lost the
original reason for its being. We are told that the relationship
between attorney and client is one to be fostered if justice is to be
efficiently administered, that full disclosure by client to attorney is
essential to the relationship and the proper execution of the attorney's
duties to the court and to the client, and that secrecy of communication
is essential to that confidence. It requires no argument to convince one
acquainted with our present system of pleading, evidence and trial and
with our complex and confusing statutes, that lawyers perform a necessary function in our society, or that full disclosure is essential to a
proper execution of the attorney's duties to the client. Such disclosure
may also be requisite to an adequate performance of his duty to the
court, but this is true only because the client also owes such a duty, if
disputes between litigants are to be honestly settled by the courts. But
why is secrecy of communication essential? Who will lose by the
client's consciously withholding part of the facts? What will his
opponent lose? Nothing more than he will lose if the facts are disclosed to the lawyer but hidden from the court. What will the court
lose? Its decision can be based only on the facts disclosed, and it can
no more act on facts disclosed to the attorney but kept from its consideration by operation of the privilege than on facts hidden in the breast
of the litigant. The only person who can lose is the client himself; and
if he chooses to suppress a part of the truth, why should any provision
be made to save him from the cost of suppression? The simple truth
is that this plausible rationalization will not bear analysis. Its first two
postulates are persuasive, but they cannot conceal the error in its third.
Practical considerations in the trial of a lawsuit do require a limited privilege. So incongruous are the roles of advocate and witness
that the courts discourage attorneys conducting an action from testifying for their clients, and canons of ethics denounce such a practice.
Furthermore, the courts have said that a trial attorney should be called
against his client only when the same evidence cannot be secured from
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other sources. There is some reason, then, why an attorney should be
privileged from testifying against a client in a trial in which he is
appearing as counsel; but even such a privilege should be carefully
limited.
A scientific code of evidence would, therefc:e, erect no privilege
for communications between client and attorney, and would contain
only some reasonable restrictions upon the right of a litigant to call an
attorney conducting a trial to testify against his client therein. But
there is no hope of securing the adoption of such a provision. It would
require almost untold effort to induce the bar even to give a proposal
for its adoption serious consideration; those laymen who are not present
or prospective litigants have little or no interest in the subject; those
laymen who are frequently actual and always potential litigants find the
privilege too often a convenience, to be fired with a desire to destroy it.
It cannot be said that the common law recognized any privilege
for communications between penitent and priest, although cases are
almost unknown wherein a priest was actually compelled to disclose
confidences of the confessional. Such communications are rarely relevant save in criminal prosecutions and actions for divorce. Even in
them counsel will not usually insist upon a disclosure, for the prejudice
which would result to his cause by a forced violation of a religious obligation would heavily outweigh the value of the testimony. Consequently it is not of great moment whether such a privilege be formally
recognized or denied.
The sentiment supporting the privilege for communications
between husband and wife is almost as strong as that behind the priestpenitent privilege. The cases in which it is applied are numerous, and
the results are serious for the opposing litigants. Although it can be
argued that the common law knew no such privilege, still the common
law rule preventing spouses from testifying for or against each other
served much the same purpose. While no weighty argument, based on
reason or factual data as opposed to sentiment, has been advanced to
justify retention of the privilege, it is more than doubtful whether a
proposal to abolish it would receive any substantial support. By making
the privilege inapplicable to actions between spouses, to criminal prosecutions of a spouse for injury done to the other or the other's property
or to the children of either, and to communications made to enable
either to commit or plan to commit a tort or a crime, much of the harm
which would otherwise be done by it would be eliminated. The necessity
for making such exceptions is, of course, a strong indication of the
advisability of destroying the entire privilege.
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No doubt information not open or officially disclosed to the public
regarding the military or naval organization or plans of the Government or concerning international relations ought not to be disclosed in
a public trial between litigants. Testimony revealing it should be inadmissible, and it should be the duty of the judge rather than a privilege
of the witness or the right of the opposing party to see that it is
excluded. The same is true as to information contained in official communications, disclosure of which would be harmful to the Government.
A comprehensive code would make provision accordingly.
EVIDENCE OF COMPARATIVELY LITTLE PROBATIVE VAL-uE

The primary postulate of a scientific investigation that all relevant
evidence is to be secured and considered is inapplicable to litigation
without some modification. A lawsuit is a proceeding primarily for the
settlement of a dispute between litigants rather than for the discovery
of truth. Its machinery is ill-suited for thorough, impartial investigation and meticulously accurate conclusions. It is the function of the
adversaries to define the issue and to produce the evidence. Speed of
determination is sometimes even more important than accuracy. Indefinite postponement of decision is impossible. The primary postulate in
litigation should be that all relevant evidence is admissible. This should
be modified only for very cogent reasons. Such reasons are found
where disadvantages involved in the reception of evidence of comparatively little probative value may outweigh the benefits which its consideration would contribute to the solution of the issue. It may be that
the evidence if received would create an illegitimate prejudice out of all
proportion to its legitimate probative value. Or its reception, involving
also the admission of evidence in opposition, may call for undue consumption of time; or the tender of the evidence may unfairly surprise
the opponent; or the contentions raised by the evidence may confuse
the issues on which the decision should depend.
Whether these disadvantages or serious dangers from them exist
in any case to such extent as to require the rejection of the evidence is
a question for the trial judge. In reaching his decision he must consider not only whether the offered evidence has any relevance to any
matter provable in the action but also how much weight it can properly
be given by the trier. To attempt to prescribe measurements of logical
value for him would be not only unwise but futile. Our law reports
are already overcrowded with decisions illustrating this unwisdom and
futility. They deal with almost every item of human behavior and
experience, but in net result they accomplish little or nothing save where
they result in rules of thumb. Certainly no code should crystallize decisions upon particular states of fact into hard and fast rules, for only
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in rare instances will exactly the same states of fact recur and rarely
will the circumstances of the trial in which evidence of them is offered
be precisely alike. No record of the proceedings can reproduce the
situation at the trial with fidelity. Consequently the ruling of the trial
judge should be final except in the most unusual cases where his action
appears to be arbitrary or capricious.
The division of the code dealing with the exclusion of relevant
evidence should, it is suggested, begin with a provision that the judge
may in his discretion exclude otherwise admissible evidence if he finds
that its probative value is outweighed by the risks that its admission will
necessitate undue consumption of time or create substantial danger of
undue prejudice or confusion of issues or unfairly surprise the adverse
party, and that decisions applying this provision shall not be precedents
in later cases involving similar facts.
EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE

No one acquainted with the reported decisions in this country dealing with opinion evidence by lay witnesses and experts, and with the
operation of the applicable law in practice will deny that the entire subject needs reconsideration. The rules which have been evolved by our
courts prohibiting a witness from describing his relevant personal
experiences in terms of inferences or conclusions are so artificial and
difficult of application as to furnish occasion for numerous unmeritorious appeals and for many puzzling reversals. Happily there appears
in the more recent opinions a tendency to encourage the trial judge to
allow witnesses to tell their stories in ordinary language and a tendency
to refuse to interfere with his rulings. Most of the decisions, however,
speaking generally, seem to require the rejection of all opinion, lay and
expert, upon issues which are to be ultimately decided by. the jury, on
the untenable ground, that to permit the jury to hear the opinion of
the witness is .tointerfere with its function of forming its own opinion.
They also exclude lay opinion, and most expert opinion, concerning
such qualities of human behavior as care, safety, propriety, reasonableness and their opposites, partly for the same reason and partly on the
theory that the elements of the behavior from which the conclusion as
to its quality is drawn can be adequately otherwise described to the trier.
Evidence of .opinion as to skill or competence falls in the same class.
On the other hand a witness may state his opinion as to time, speed,
distance, direction, size, weight, form, identity and some similar matters if what the court regards as a proper showing of qualification has
been made. To cap the climax, a witness who has once seen a person
write may give his opinion upon the issue whether that person wrote a
disputed document.
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When a witness is trying to tell about what he has experienced, to
attempt to compel him to distinguish between so-called fact and opinion is to invite profitless quibbling. No such distinction is analytically
possible. The English common law does not try to prevent a witness
from describing what he has perceived in terms which include inferences. If a more accurate impression can be conveyed by detailing the
data, the details may be brought out on cross-examination, or the
judge may require the witness to state them before or in connection
with his conclusions. A code should contain a rule to the effect that
a witness in testifying to what he has perceived may give his testimony in terms which include inferences and may state all relevant inferences, whether or not embracing ultimate issues to be decided by
the jury, unless the judge finds that it requires expertness to draw the
inferences and that the witness has not the requisite qualifications.
The judge should, of course, have the discretion to require the witness, before testifying in terms of inference, to state the data upon
which the inference is founded.
As early as the fourteenth century, the English judges sought and
received the aid of expert witnesses; and ever since that time the common law courts have received testimony of competent experts. No
one questions the necessity for expert testimony; but the practices
which have grown up around its use have become a scandal. Members
of the bench and bar and of other learned professions are demanding
reform. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association have given the subject serious consideration.,
They are in practical agreement upon an Act, the chief provisions of
which are that (i) the court may appoint expert witnesses to testify
in an action in which it determines that expert evidence will be of substantial assistance; (2) experts not appointed by the court may be
called, but only after notice to the adversary; (3) the court may order
submission of persons and things to examination by experts under
reasonable conditions, and may order the experts to file written reports of their examinations and the inferences drawn therefrom; (4)
the reports of experts are open to inspection by the parties; (5) the
reports may be read in evidence by the experts; and (6) an expert
may state his inferences from relevant matters perceived by him or
from evidence introduced at the trial and seen or heard by him or from
his special skill or knowledge without first specifying as an hypothesis
or otherwise the data from which he draws the inferences. Provision
is also made for compensation of experts appointed by the court.
6. (1937)
A. REP. 583.

PRoc. NAT. CONF. CoMM'Rs UNIFORM STATE LAWS 339; (1938) 63 A. B.
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This proposed Act tends to eliminate some of the evils arising
from the present system in which expert witnesses are frequently nothing more than expert advocates. It also enables court, counsel and
experts to avoid the absurdities which practitioners have, with the
consent of the courts, piled upon the hypothetical question. The Act
leaves much to be desired, but it goes about as far as the profession
can be induced to go at present.
HEARSAY

The hearsay rule, like the rest of the law of Evidence, has been
said to be the child of the jury system. As to much of the law of Evidence the entire lack of influence of the jury can be clearly demonstrated; as to the hearsay rule also the statement, unless qualified, will
not bear close investigation. It would more nearly approximate the
truth to say that the hearsay rule is the child of the adversary system,
and that the jury is a foster parent foisted-fupon it by the judges and
text-writers of the nineteenth century. The Anglo-Saxon trial by
ordeal, the Anglo-Norman trial by battle, trial by compurgation both
before and after the Norman Conquest, were essentially adversary proceedings. Though they were conducted under the supervision of the
court, the adversaries furnished the actors through whom they appealed
to the Deity for a decision. The institution of the Norman inquest,
from which the jury evolved, was revolutionary. It not only substituted a rational investigation for a more or less superstititous ceremony, but it removed the proceeding for the determination of the facts
completely from the control of the litigants. To use Mr. Thayer's
phrase, it made the decision depend upon "what a set of strangers
might say, witnesses selected by a public officer". 7 And these strangers gave their answers without the assistance of the court" and without
evidentiary help or hindrance from the litigants. The parties were
permitted to state their respective contentions. Later they secured the
privilege of furnishing additional information to the jury. Of this privilege they took greater and greater advantage, so that by the opening
of the I6oo's juries ordinarily depended for their information chiefly
upon evidence given in open court. And before the middle of the
i7oo's, jurors were obliged to rely only upon what was thus presented
in determining the facts of the particular case. This evidence was
furnished almost, if not quite, exclusively by the parties. The purely
investigative system of the Norman inquest had become our modern
adversary system.
7. THAYER,

0898) 56.
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During the first few centuries of the jury system, the jury based
its decision upon what the jurors themselves knew of the matter in
dispute and what they learned "through the words of their fathers and
through such words of persons whom they are bound to trust as
worthy". 8 Until the end of the sixteenth century hearsay was received
without question. Some objections were made shortly before the opening of the I6oo's, but these had to do with weight rather than admissibility. By the middle of that century they grew in number and
strength, so that by the beginning of the 170o's hearsay was excluded
except when offered in corroboration of non-hearsay. By the end of
the third decade of the eighteenth century, it was generally rejected.
The earliest reason for rejection was lack of oath. As Chief Baron
Gilbert put it: "Besides .

.

. the person who spake it was not upon

oath; and if a man had been in court and said the same thing and
had not sworn it, he had not been believed in a court of justice"."
While the jurors were regarded principally as witnesses rather than
as finders of fact, their oaths sufficed to give the requisite religious
sanction common to all other forms of solemn investigation. When
it was perceived that the author of the hearsay statement was the real
witness, and the witness on the stand merely a conduit for the conveyance of the author's testimony, it was to be expected that the lack
of oath would be urged and accepted as a ground for excluding the
statement. However much it may be regretted, the sanction of the
oath has lost most of its effectiveness. If lack of oath alone were the
basis for the rejection of hearsay, it could not suffice to excuse the
exclusion of any helpful evidence. Nor does the presence or absence
of a jury in any wise affect the necessity for the oath. As early as
i668, sworn hearsay was excluded, because "the other party could not
cross-examine the party sworn, which is the common course", and in
1696 sworn depositions were rejected for the same reason.10 Nothing
is said about the jury or about its supposed credulity. Cross-examination is not required, but opportunity for cross-examination. The
adversary not the jury is to be protected.
As our system changed in character from investigative to adversary, the rule rejecting hearsay and the rule making opportunity
for cross-examination a requisite of admissibility developed side by
side. This was no mere historical accident. The civil law, like the
common law, requires witnesses to speak under oath with its accom8. BRuNmR, THE OlUGIN OF JURY CoURTs (1872) 427, 452, as quoted in 5 WIGMORE, EVI IENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1364.

9. GnBEr, EVDENCE (2d ed. 176o, written before 1726) i52.
io. Anonymous, Roll. Abr., 2, 679, pl. 9, as quoted in 5 WIGmom, EVIDENCE
§ 1364, n. 5.
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panying sanctions. It requires confrontation in some cases; but it remains an inquisitorial rather than an adversary system. It does not
know anything like the Anglo-American cross-examination. Bentham
says: "The peculiarity of the practice called in England cross-examination,-the complete absence of it in every system of procedure
grounded on the Roman, with the single exception of the partial and
narrow use made of it in the case of confrontation,-is a fact unnoticed till now in any printed book, but which will be as conclusively
as concisely ascertained at any time, by the impossibility of finding a
word to render it by, in any other language". 1 And the civil law
does not reject hearsay. To be sure, it has no jury; but the opportunity for cross-examination is not a necessary element of a jury system, while it is the very heart of an adversary theory of litigation.
Consequently, not the jury system but rather the adversary theory
of litigation, coupled with then accepted notions as to the value of an
oath account for the hearsay rule as it was at the opening of the nineteenth century.
At that time the proponent of hearsay had the burden of producing precedents to warrant its admissibility. This he could do for dying
declarations, pedigree statements and entries in a parson's books, in
account books of stewards and in certain other writings. But a strict
construction of the precedents resulted in the creation of some artificial
limitations even upon these exceptions. As the judges began their
attempts to rationalize the results of the decisions dealing with evidence, they first relied upon the general notion that a party was obliged
to produce the best evidence available, but no more. Had they applied
this generally, hearsay would have been received whenever better evidence could not be obtained. Therefore, the judges discovered a special sort of necessity in these exceptional cases, and found in addition
some circumstance which was thought to make the admissible hearsay
less unreliable than hearsay in general. By the fourth decade of the
i8oo's, it became the fashion to attribute the exclusion of hearsay to
the incapacity of the jury to evaluate it, and in the development of
exceptions to the rule, courts have doubtless been influenced by this
notion. Modern text-writers and judges have purported to find for
each exception some sort of necessity for resort to hearsay and some
condition attending the making of the excepted statement which will
enable the jury to put a fair value upon it and will thus serve as a substitute for cross-examination. A careful examination of the eighteen
or nineteen classes of utterances, each of which is now recognized as
II. 2 BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JuDicIAL EVIDNcE (Mill's ed. 1827) 433-434.
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an exception to the hearsay rule by some respectable authority, will
reveal that in many of them the necessity resolves itself into mere convenience and the substitute for cross-examination is imperceptible.
The fact is that no one theory will harmonize the decisions. The reception of admissions can be explained only upon the adversary theory
of litigation. A hearsay statement of a party to the action is received
against him although he is incompetent as a witness and has no per-

sonal knowledge of the matter stated, and the statement when made
was highly self-serving. On the other hand, relevant former testimony of a witness, given under oath and fully cross-examined, is
rejected when offered against a party who had no opportunity to crossexamine the witness. Moreover, by the so-called orthodox view, it is
excluded even when offered against such a party, if it would not have
been receivable against the proponent. Only an extreme application
of the adversary theory can account for this. In most of the exceptions, however, the adversary theory is disregarded. There is nothing
in any of the situations to warrant depriving the adversary of an opportunity to cross-examine; but those rationalizing the results purport to
find some substitute for cross-examination. In most instances one
will look in vain for anything more than a situation in which an ordinary man making such a statement would positively desire to tell the
truth; and in some the most that can be claimed is the absence of a
motive to falsify. Once in a while a court will frankly put the case
for reception upon the ground that all available evidence is necessary
and that hearsay is better than nothing.
If the courts were really convinced that uncross-examined evidence is too unreliable to be considered, they would be compelled to
determine what elements of weakness cross-examination is designed
to uncover, and how many of those elements need be present in any
case or class of cases in order to condemn it. No doubt properly conducted examination will test all qualities of the perception, memory,
narration and veracity of the witness. Experience on the bench and
at the bar makes it abundantly clear that the chief value of crossexamination is to disclose defects relating to perception or memory;
occasionally it reveals misleading qualities in narration, and rather
infrequently exposes intentional falsehood. Consequently any evidence which requires the jury to rely upon the perception, memory,
narration or veracity of a person who is not under oath and subject
to cross-examination has some of the dangers of hearsay; and evidence which requires reliance upon his perception and memory, even
though his narration and veracity be guaranteed, contains the greater
of these dangers. Yet much evidence of non-assertive conduct requir-
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ing such reliance is never questioned on the ground of hearsay; and
the leading writer on the subject in effect defines hearsay as an extrajudicial statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted
in it.12
The fact is, then, that the law governing hearsay today is a conglomeration of inconsistencies, developed as a result of conflicting
theories. Refinements and qualifications within the exceptions only
add to its irrationality. The courts by multiplying exceptions reveal
their conviction that relevant hearsay evidence normally has real probative value, and is capable of valuation by a jury as well as by other
triers of fact. Almost every statute regulating procedure before
administrative tribunals makes hearsay admissible. And it is a mere
blinking of facts to pretend that the administrative official ordinarily
presiding at a hearing has more competence to value testimony than
has a jury acting under the supervision of a judge. The number of
cases tried before juries as compared with the number tried before
judges without juries and before administrative tribunals is small
indeed. The time is ripe for radical liberalization of the common law
rule.
That liberalization should begin by confining hearsay by definition to conduct intended to operate as an assertion, evidence of which
is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. It would
then provide that evidence of hearsay should be admitted if the court
finds that the person making the hearsay assertion is unavailable as a
witness, or if the court finds that he is available and that before the
close of the trial or hearing he will be produced by the proponent for
cross-examination on demand of the adversary. The court should
have discretion to reject the evidence in the latter situation if it finds
that the adversary has good reason for desiring to cross-examine the
asserter and that the rejection will not interfere with an orderly and
effective presentation of the proponent's case. Additional rules governing the admissibility of admissions, personal, adoptive and vicarious,
of official statements and records, of judgments, of commercial lists
and the like, of learned treatises, and of reputation should be drafted
in plain and simple terms. A provision admitting books and entries
made in the regular course of business, embodying the most liberal provisions of current applicable statutes, would complete the chapter.
These proposals call for greater liberalization than is found in
any current legislation governing the admissibility of evidence in the
courts, but do not go beyond present administrative practice.
12. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 194o) § 1361.
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AUTHENTICATION

AND

CONTENT

OF WRITINGS

The common law rules governing this subject are not difficult, but
they can be simplified. Concerning proof of authentication of ordinary writings, no unusual requirement as to quantity or quality of
evidence is necessary. Where, however, the writing is of such age
as to make it likely that percipient witnesses capable of giving satisfactory evidence of genuineness will be unavailable, the common law
rule in simplified form should be stated. It should be provided that
the question of authentication is for the trier of fact after evidence has
been introduced from which the judge finds that the writing is at least
a given number of years old, is in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, and at the time of its discovery was
in a place in which such a document, if authentic, would be likely to
be found.
Special simplified provisions like those contained in Rule 44 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be made for evidence of
official records.' 3 As for proof of content of other writings, the principle at the base of the so-called best evidence rule should be stated.
Evidence other than the writing itself should be received if the judge
finds that the original is now unavailable for some reason other than the
neglect or wrong-doing of the proponent of the evidence, or that it would
be unfair or inexpedient to require the proponent to produce the writing.
One other situation must be cared for. If the dispute as to the availability of the original turns on whether a writing produced by the
opponent of the secondary evidence is the original, the trial judge must
answer that question in order to rule on the admissibility of the evi-

dence. If he decides against the opponent, he will admit it. If he
decides against the proponent, he will exclude it; but if the writing thus
found to be the original is introduced in evidence, the rule is satisfied.
Thereafter proponent's secondary evidence is admissible as tending to
show that the writing so introduced has been altered or that the content
of the genuine original was entirely different. The code should therefore provide that evidence other than the writing should be received
after a writing found by the court to be the original has been introduced.
Such provisions would be easy to apply and would accomplish
every legitimate purpose of the common law rule.
PRESUMPTIONS

Limits of space prevent an exposition of the intolerable condition
of the existing law governing presumptions. That has been done else13. 48

STAT.

lO64 (1934), 28 U. S. C. A. § 723c (Supp. 1939).
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where almost ad nauseant. What is needed is a simple, legislative solution. No very simple solution will be completely rational. A rational
solution has been attempted by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, 14
which has declared that the effect of a presumption should depend upon
the reasons which caused the courts or legislature to create it. To
attempt to classify the myriads of existing presumptions or to assign
to each a given effect would be hazardous or hopeless. One of the
simplest proposals is to adopt the Thayer theory, recognized by the
United States Supreme Court, 15 which makes the presumption vanish
whenever evidence has been introduced which would justify a finding
of the non-existence of the presumed fact. This cannot be rationally
justified for presumptions created for any reason other than to require
a litigant to demonstrate that he has evidence sufficient to raise an issue
for the jury or other trier of fact. Another easily understood and
easily applied solution is found in Pennsylvania where the normal effect
of a presumption is to put the burden of persuasion upon the party
asserting the non-existence of the presumed fact.'
This runs counter
to the generally accepted but logically indefensible dogma that the
burden of persuasion never shifts. A possible compromise is to apply
the Thayer theory where the basic fact upon which the presumption
rests has no probative value as evidence of the presumed fact; to use
the Pennsylvania doctrine where the basic fact has sufficient probative
value as evidence of the presumed fact to support a finding of the presumed fact; and to provide that where the basic fact has some probative
value as evidence of the presumed fact but not sufficient value to support a finding, the question of the existence or non-existence of the
presumed fact shall be for the trier of fact unless evidence has been
introduced sufficient to compel a finding. The compromise has the
merit of giving a substantial procedural effect to every -presumption.
The question for the trial judge is one which he constantly has to
answer, and can answer without undue difficulty, namely what, if any,
probative value has the basic fact of the presumption.
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Any code of rules governing evidence can be made cumbersome
and impracticable by an unsympathetic attitude in applying it and by
insistence upon enforcing its letter. Consequently provision should be
made to discourage obstructive tactics by counsel, to prevent appeals
14. O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 17o AtI. 486 (934).
15. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 3o3 U. S. 161 (937),
(1938) 5 U. oF CL L. REv. 685.

114 A. L. R. 1218,

x6. Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof (933)

47 HAxv. L. Rxv. 59, 6o.
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and reversals for immaterial variations from the rules, and to give the
judge effective control over the trial. Rules similar to those tentatively
approved by the American Law Institute at its annual meeting in i94o
would tend to accomplish the desired purposes:
(i) If the judge finds that there is no bona fide dispute
between the parties to the action as to any matter, no rule restricting the admissibility of relevant evidence, except evidence subject
to exclusion by reason of privilege, shall be enforced as to evidence
concerning that matter, even though it is in issue under the
pleadings.
(2) A verdict or finding shall not be set aside or the judgment based thereon be reversed by reason of the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence relevant to a matter if the court which
is to determine the effect of the error finds from concessions of
counsel or any part of the record in the case that there was no bona
fide dispute between the parties as to the matter and the verdict or
finding is consistent therewith.
(3) A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the
judgment or decision based thereon be reversed by reason of the
erroneous admission of evidence unless
(a) there appears of record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so stated as to make clear to the judge and the
adverse party the specific ground of objection, and
(b) the court which is to determine the effect of the error or
errors is of opinion that the erroneously admitted evidence
probably had substantial influence in producing the verdict or
finding.
(4) A verdict or finding shall not be set aside nor shall the
judgment or decision based thereon be reversed on account of the
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless
(a) it appears of record that the proponent of the evidence either
made known to the judge and the adversary the substance of
the offered evidence in a form and by a method approved by
the judge, or indicated the substance of the desired evidence
by suggestive questions properly put under rules governing
the use of leading questions, and
(b) the court which is to determine the effect of the error or
errors is of opinion that the excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in producing a different
verdict or finding.
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(5) After the close of the evidence and arguments of counsel
the judge may sum up the evidence and comment to the jury upon
the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, if
he instructs the jury that they are to determine for themselves the
weight of the evidence and the credit to be given to the witnesses.
The foregoing suggestions are submitted without attempting to
draft specific provisions or to present full argument in support of them.
It would be optimistic to hope that many members of the bench and bar
would, of their own motion, devote much time to an investigation and
consideration of their merits and demerits even in normal times; to
expect them to do so today would be fatuous. Perhaps in more
propitious times these suggestions may profitably be renewed.

